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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BUT HOW FAR?: RITE-HITE CORP. V.
KELLEY CO.'S EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE
OF PATENT DAMAGES
What is the appropriate scope of lost profit damages in a patent
infringement suit? The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, addressed that issue in a recent case of first
impression, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.1 There, the court extended the scope of compensable lost profit damages to include profits
from the sale of devices not covered by the patent at issue in the
suit.2 In so ruling, the court relied on the lower court's factual
finding that but for the defendant's infringement of the patent at
suit, the patentee would have sold more of the product not itself
covered by that patent.3 The court's use of the "but for" test to
determine the scope of patent damages constitutes a significant
expansion of what normally qualifies as compensable lost profits.
This Recent Development will attempt to understand Rite-Hite in
light of the general law of patent damages, and will also explore
some of the opinion's implications for parties and courts involved
in patent infringement suits.

156 F.3d 1538,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affg inpart,vacating inpart,

774 F. Supp. 1514, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (E.D. Wis. 1991), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995) (The suit was bifurcated into damage proceedings (id.) and liability proceedings (629
F. Supp. 1042, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd, 819 F.2d 1120, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1915 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).

2 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1543.
'Id. at 1543, 1548-49.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rite-Hite and Kelley both produced vehicle restraints.' Vehicle
restraints are safety devices designed to keep trucks secured to
loading docks during the loading and unloading of freight.5 Trucks
that separate from loading docks create hazards for forklift
operators and other warehouse personnel." In the late-seventies
and early-eighties, Rite-Hite, recognizing the hazard and seeing a
potentially lucrative market, pioneered the development of vehicle
restraint devices. 7
In April, 1980, Rite-Hite introduced its "Automatic Dok-Lok"
model 100 vehicle restraint device (hereinafter ADL-100),' the first
such device on the market.9 The ADL-100 operated automatically,
using a motor and pivoted hook technology to secure the truck to
the dock.10
In April, 1981, Rite-Hite obtained U.S. Patent
4,264,259 for the pivoted hook technology embodied in the ADL100.1" Rite-Hite introduced another vehicle restraint in late
summer of 1981, the "Manual Dok-Lok" model 55 (hereinafter
MDL-55), a manually operated vehicle restraint which embodied a
new type of hook and lock technology. 2 The list price of the
MDL-55 ranged from one-third to one-half the $1000-$1500
wholesale price of the ADL-100.' 3 In May of 1981, Rite-Hite
sought patent protection for this new technology, which it obtained
in February,141983, under U.S. Patent 4,373,847 (hereinafter the
'847 patent).
Before the development of vehicle restraints, Kelley and Rite-Hite
were the key players in the "dock leveler" market.5
Dock
4

Id. at 1543.
'Id. at 1542.
'Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1542.
'Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1519-20 (E.D. Wis. 1991), affd inpart,
vacated in part, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).

'Id. at 1520.
'Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 629 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd, 819 F.2d
1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
' 0 Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1520.
"Rite-Hite, 629 F. Supp. at 1049.
Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1520.
"Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1543.
14Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1517, 1520.

Id. at 1519.
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levelers, as distinguished from vehicle restraints, are not designed
to secure the truck to the dock; rather, they bridge the gap between
the edges of the truck and dock. i6 Although levelers are independently useful, restraints depend on levelers to reach their full
utility.17 When Kelley lagged behind Rite-Hite in its development
of vehicle restraints, it feared that it would lose not only the
burgeoning restraint market, but also its share of the leveler
market."8 Kelley therefore created its own vehicle restraining
device. 9
In early 1982, after purchasing one of the first MDL-55s and
obtaining a copy of the '847 patent,2 Kelley developed an automatic vehicle restraint, the "Truk Stop," 21 whose technology was

equivalent to the technology of the '847 patent.2 Kelley proceeded
to enter the vehicle restraint market in July, 1982.23 Even though
the Truk Stop infringed the patented technology embodied in the
MDL-55, the Truk Stop was designed and marketed primarily to
compete with the ADL-100.24 Kelley chose to compete with the
ADL-100 because the ADL-100 was automated, and therefore the
more commercially successful of Rite-Hite's restraints. 25 Moreover, Kelley marketed the Truk Stop by "snatching" Rite-Hite's
sales contacts 26 and then underbidding Rite-Hite on average by
$200 to $300.27

On March 22, 1983, Rite-Hite sued Kelley in the Eastern District
of Wisconsin, claiming that Kelley's Truk Stop restraint infringed
the '847 patent.2s Rite-Hite sought lost profit damages resulting
not only from the lost sales of the MDL-55, which actually embodied the '847 patent's technology, but also from its lost ADL-100
16Id.

17

Id. at 1530.

'a Id. at 1521.
19

Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1521-22.

20 Id.
21 Rite-Hite, 629

F. Supp. at 1053-54. Although Kelley obtained the device and the
patent, the court found Kelley not liable for willful infringement. Id. at 1045.
2Id, at 1065.
23
Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1525.
2Id at 1530.
2Id. at 1522.
2Id at 1521.
27 Id.

at 1529.
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1542.
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Rite-Hite also sought lost profit damages for its lost

leveler sales.3 0 In bifurcated liability and damages proceedings,
the district court, inter alia, found Kelley liable for infringement of
the '847 patent and awarded Rite-Hite lost profits on the ADL-55
and MDL-100. s1 The district court also awarded damages for the
dock levelers that would have been sold along with the restraints.3 2 The court based the award on the finding that RiteHite's lost sales were a foreseeable result of Kelley's infringement. 33
Kelley appealed the damage award for the ADL-100 and the
levelers. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's award for
lost profits from the ADL-100, but vacated its award of lost profits
from the lost dock leveler sales.3 4 While the court employed the
same reasoning as the lower court regarding the ADL-100, s
because the dock levelers did not properly function with Rite-Hite's
restraints, or directly compete with the Truk Stop, the court found
them beyond the realm of compensable damages.'
II. LAW OF LOST PROFIT PATENT DAMAGES

Any examination of the law of patent damages must start with
the Patent Clause of the Constitution. The Patent Clause provides
Congress with the power to secure patents for limited times as a
way of promoting the "useful [a]rts."3 7 Unfortunately, any
mention of how such security is to be effected is conspicuously
absent from the Clause. Specifically, the Constitution is silent on

at 1543.

2Id.

so Id.
31 Id.
2

3

Id.

Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546.
4Id.
at 1543.
Id. at 1546-49.
Mid. at 1551.
37 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The relevant text of the Clause reads: "The Congress
shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries...." Id.
3
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the issue of damages.38
Congress, pursuant to its granted authority, and in pursuit of the
Constitution's policy of promoting the useful arts, passed a statute
that authorizes grants of patent protection. 9 One of the statute's
provisions provides for damages in the event of infringement. 4°
The statute requires a damage award in all cases of infringement.
The court shall award damages, even, presumably, where the
actual damage to a patentee's business does not equal the reasonable royalty rate.41
Courts have interpreted this damage provision of the statute
quite expansively. In Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument
Co., the Federal Circuit noted that the statute provides only the
"reasonable royalty" floor below which no damages can fall in
compensating the patentee.42 There, the court inferred that
Congress meant to put no upper limit on what should constitute
"adequate" compensation. 3 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. interpreted "adequate to
compensate" as "full compensation for 'any damages.'" The law
of patent damages, therefore, comports with the general law of
damages by requiring an infringer to place a patentee in the
position he would have occupied but for the infringement.'
Traditionally, courts have relied on a calculation of lost profits as
a method for measuring what losses the patentee has actually

' See generally, Timothy J. Malloy & Robert P. Renke, PatentDamagesRevisited: Recent
Issues Before the Federal Circuit,in PATENT LITIGATION 1994, at 277 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 397, 1994) (examining lost profit
damages issues).
'" Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
40 35 U.S.C. § 284, which reads in relevant part: "Upon finding for the claimant the court
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with the interest and costs as fixed by the court."
41 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRcUIT 409 (1991) (citing Water
Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988)).
4 836 F.2d 1320, 1326, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
3Id.

461 U.S. 648, 654, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1185 (1983).
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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suffered." Indeed, the Supreme Court in Aro Manufacturing Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. endorsed the use of lost profits
as a measure of patent damages by framing the appropriate
question to be asked in the event of infringement: "[H]ad the
[i]nfringer not infringed, what would [the patentee] have made?"'
The patent holder bears the burden of proving the propriety of an
award of lost profit damages." To meet this burden, the patentee
must first show a causal relationship between the infringement and
the lost sales, as well as show the amount of profits that would
have been made on those sales.49 The patentee, however, need
only show a reasonable probability that the infringement caused
the lost profits before the burden shifts to the infringer to prove
otherwise.'
Notably, the patentee, when proving reasonable
probability, need only show that some of its lost sales would have
been made but for the infringement before the burden shifts to the
infringer to disprove the rest.5 l Moreover, any doubt about the
precise amount
of lost profits damages is settled against the
52
infringer.

The issue of lost profits can arise in two factual contexts, either
the two-supplier or multi-competitor market. In a two-supplier
market, an act of infringement gives rise to an inference of
causation between the infringement and the patentee's lost
sales.53 In such a situation, the infringer's sales represent the
proper measure of damages." The multi-competitor market,
however, requires a more nuanced causation analysis. The

*Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (finding lost profits appropriate measure of damages in two-supplier market).
47 377 U.S. 476, 507, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964).
HARMON, supra note 41, at 413.
"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853,863,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed.
Cir. 01985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
5 Id.
gild. at 1141-42; see also Paul M. Janicke, ContemporaryIssues in PatentDamages, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 691, 704-06 & nn.74-78 (1993) (discussing trend of shifting burden to
defendant on patent damages established by Kaufman and Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley
Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
' Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141, 17 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1828 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
'3 Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
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presence of additional competitors in a multi-competitor market
prevents the law from presuming that the infringer's sales would
The prevalence of the multihave accrued to the patentee.'
competitor market" has given rise to the standard test for determining lost profit damages.
A. PANDUIT AND ITS PROGENY

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc." provides
the classic test for proving entitlement to an award of lost profits.
The test is useful for both two-supplier" and multi-supplier"
cases. Under the test, a patentee must show: 1) demand for the
patented product; 2) absence of an acceptable non-infringing
substitute; 3) its own manufacturing and marketing capability to
exploit the demand; and, 4) the amount of profit it would have
made.' The combination of these elements, the court reasoned,
provides an accurate method for determining whether, and how
much, profit would have been made by a patentee but for a
defendant's infringement.61
The Panduit test thus endorses the use of "but for" causation to
establish the scope of compensable damages. Those profits the
patentee can prove it would have made but for the infringing
product's presence in the market are compensable. However, the
Panduit test is not a pure but for test.62 It does not define
compensable lost profits simply as any lost profits the patentee can
prove would have existed but for the defendant's infringement.
Rather, the test identifies the exact conditions that must be present
Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See John C. Jarosz & Erin M. Page, The Panduit Lost Profits Test After BIC Leisure
v. Windsurfing, 3 FED. CIRcurr B.J. 311, 321 (1993) (regarding rarity of two-supplier
markets).
87 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
" Kaufman provides an example of the test's application to a two-supplier market. 926
F.2d at 1143. There, the test was used in conjunction with Lam, Inc.'s two-supplier test.
Id,
"Panduit itself arose from the multi-competitor electrical duct market. 575 F.2d at

1155.
Id. at 1156.
1d,
See Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 297-98 (proposing simplified "but for" approach
to patent damages).
61
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before but for causation can be established.'
Subsequent cases have challenged the test's coherence by
focusing on the logic of Panduit'ssecond element, the absence of an
acceptable, non-infringing substitute. These cases have attempted
to refine the test's ability to detect the presence of but for causation." In State Industries v. Mor-Flo Industries, the Federal
Circuit held that, in cases where acceptable substitutes do exist,
courts should look to the patentee's share of the overall market to
determine damages." Specifically, it found that a patentee is
entitled to a percentage of the infringing item's profits equal to the
patentee's share in the overall market for that good." The court
reasoned that the mere presence of an acceptable, non-infringing
substitute does not necessarily imply the absence of legitimate lost
profit damages."' Rather, it recognized that multiple interests can
successfully compete and hold relatively stable shares of a market.6' A literal application of the Panduit test, the court reasoned,
would overlook this not so subtle feature of the actual market. The
court's market share response to the absolutism of Panduit'ssecond
element thus represents an attempt to make the test's results more
reflective of what actually would have existed in the world "but for"
an act of infringement.
The court also made a significant general ruling on the Panduit
test itself, finding it a useful, but non-exclusive, means of establishing entitlement to lost profit damages.69 Realizing the need for
flexibility when dealing with the intricacies of the market, it
resisted the tendency to rely on the overly formulaic approach of
the Panduit test.70 Instead, the State Industries' court endorsed
a but for test broader than both the one stated in Panduit, and
even its own modified market share approach. Concerned with
determining what damages were in fact caused by an act of
63 See Janicke, supra note 51, at 701 (discussing literalism of courts' application of
Panduitfactors).
Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 280-81.
"883 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990) (involving
multi-supplier water heater insulation market).

oId. at 1578.
6Id. at 1579.
' State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
70 Janicke, supra note 51, at 704-05.
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infringement, the court encouraged the use of any logical means
that would help to reach that determination.
71
BIC Leisure Products v. Windsurfing International, Inc.
clarified State Industries' modification of the Panduit test by
further refining the test's ability to define caused-in-fact damages. 72 In BIC Leisure, Windsurfing International proved that BIC
infringed its sailboard patent.7' Because the overall sailboard
market included sales of third party, non-infringing substitutes,
Windsurfing relied on the market share test of State Industries'to
argue its entitlement to a share of BIC's profits equal to Windsurfing's share of the overall market.7 4
The court refused to endorse Windsurfing's analysis. The State
Industries' court reasoned that the mere presence of an acceptable,
non-infringing substitute item does not necessarily imply the
absence of lost profits. Similarly, the BIC Leisure court reasoned
that the mere presence of a traditional market share does not imply
a but for causal connection between infringement and lost profits. 75 Accordingly, the court followed State Industries' example
and avoided the mechanical application of any but for formula.7 6
In so doing, it further investigated the realities of the sailboard
market before deciding what would have happened in that market
but for BIC's infringement.7 7
The court in BIC Leisure noted that markets can be price
sensitive, and that sub-markets based on price can exist within an
overall market for a particular type of good. 7' The court found
that the sailboard market was such a price sensitive market and
that the price differential between the Windsurfing and BIC boards
was significant enough to place them in two distinct sub-markets

1 F.3d 1214, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 283.
" BIC Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
74
Id. at 1217.
""Id. at 1218. For a detailed treatment of the facts of BIC Leisure see Jarosz & Page,
supra
7 note 56, at 312-14.
1 See Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 288 (explaining how BICLeisure's refusal to find
causation based on market share alone actually clarified, and followed lead of, State
Industries).
"78 BIC Leisure, 1 F.3d at 1216-18.
Id. at 1218-19.
71
72
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of the overall sailboard market. 7' Absent BIC's infringing sailboard, consumers would have chosen another sailboard closer to the
BIC board's price range.' In effect, the court ruled that the two
boards did not compete with one another."' Finding no direct
correlation between BIC's infringement and Windsurfing's lost
sales, the court ruled that Windsurfing failed to show that "but for"
BIC's infringement it would have earned profits equal to its share
of the overall market.8 2
BIC Leisure then stands for much the same principle as State

Industries. Both courts rejected the imposition of a rigid framework for determining what the patentee would have achieved but
for the defendant's infringement. Rather, the courts tailored the
but for analysis to the realities of the market place. This practical
approach led the courts to endorse a "straightforward"' but for
test as the true measure of lost profit damages, relegating the
criteria of the Panduittest, and formal tests generally, to the role
of important, but not necessary, indicia.
B. ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE; LOST CONVOYED SALES

In a further attempt to fully compensate the patentee for losses
resulting from infringement, courts have elaborated on the but for
doctrine with the "entire market value" rule.' The rule arose
from circumstances in which the patented technology at issue in a
suit served as a component of a larger device.' The rule allows
for damages on the entire device if the patentee normally would
have anticipated making the sale of the unpatented components
along with the sale of the patented components."
The entire market value rule spawned yet a further avenue for
79

ld. at 1219.
so Id.
81 Id.

BIC Leisure, 1 F.3d at 1219.
"Because an undiluted but for analysis calls for a very close assessment of marketplace
realities, its application may prove anything but "straightforward.* See infra text
accompanying notes 130-158.
"Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22-23,223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 591 (Fed. Cir 1984).
8 Id.

Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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patentees to reach full compensation-the lost "convoyed" or
"collateral" sales doctrine. 7 Under this doctrine, a patentee can
receive damages from the lost sales of related, "collateral" devices
not covered by the patent in suit, but normally sold along with the
patented device.88 Profits from the sales of component or collateral devices, however, must still satisfy the but for causation test.
The patentee must prove that it would have made the sales of the
device but for the act of infringement.8 9
Significantly then, the law leading up to Rite-Hite firmly
established the principle that a patentee is to be fully compensated
for losses resulting from infringement. Moreover, courts have
endorsed the use of but for causation to identify which losses have
so resulted. These losses can include lost profits not only from the
lost sales of a patented device, but also from the lost sales of any
component or collateral device that would have been made but for
an act of infringement. Importantly, however, no court had ever
dealt with Rite-Hite's factual scenario. Therefore, prior to Rite-Hite,
whether lost profit damages could extend to profits on similar
devices not covered by the patent in suit remained an open
question.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT's ANALYSIS
In Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit determined that Kelley was
liable for all foreseeable lost profit damages caused in fact by its
infringement of the '847 patent.' The court relied on the district
court findings that the Truk Stop caused the lost sales of, and

B?George

F. Pappas et al., Law of Patent Damages, C961 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:

SECURING AND ENFORCING PATENT RIGHTS 65, 75 (1994).

Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (regarding award
of lost profits on unpatented ind~istrial plastic wrap after infringement of patented wrapping
machine: "In determining whether a patentee should be awarded lost profits on unpatented
accessory sales, the deciding factor is whether the patentee could normally anticipate the
sale of unpatented items as well as the patented ones." (citing PaperConvertingMach. Co.,
745 F.2d at 23)).
89King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (regarding component parts); Kaufman Co., 926 F.2d at 1136 (regarding
convoyed sales).
" Rite-Hit Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995).
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primarily competed with, the ADL-100. The court found that,
notwithstanding the fact that the ADL-100 was not covered by the
'847 patent, Rite-Hite's lost profits on the ADL-100 were within the
scope of compensable lost profit damages.9 '
To reach its conclusion, the court relied on the language of the
patent statute's damages clause,' as well as on past cases
interpreting that language." According to the court's reading, the
statute and cases called for the patentee to be fully compensated for
all damages resulting from the infringement, with such damages to
be determined by use of the "but for" causation test. If a patentee
would have made a sale but for the infringement, then he is
entitled to the profits lost from the sale, regardless of which
product's sale is at issue.'
In so concluding, the court explicitly rejected Kelley's argument
that the only compensable lost profits are those that result directly
from the lost sales of products which themselves embody the patent
in suit.95 According to the court, Kelley's conception of the value
of a patent-that it is limited to the value of the potential profits
directly resulting from the sale of the device whose patent is at
issue-was too narrow. 6 The court reasoned that the broader but
for test comes closer to approximating the value of a patent by
demonstrating all that its protection would have provided.97
Relying on traditional tort notions of proximate cause, the court
limited compensable lost profits to those whose occurrences are
reasonably foreseeable as well as caused-in-fact by the infringer."
Here, the court agreed with the district court's finding that because
the Truk Stop directly competed with the ADL-100, Kelley should
have foreseen Rite-Hite's lost profits on that item. 99

91/d.

"Id. at 1544 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (see supra note 40 for relevant text of § 284)).
9Id. at 1545; see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases

relied on by the court.
"Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
96Id. at 1548.
s Id.
97 Id. (holding that " 'intrinsic value of the patent' is subsumed in the 'but for' analysis').
9Id. at 1546 (citing Street, 1 Foundationsof Legal Liability 110 (1906), as cited in W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th ed.
1984)).
9Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546.
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The court also addressed the constitutionality of allowing lost
profit damages to compensate for harm done to the sale of devices
not covered by the litigated patent."° Kelley argued that such
damages harm the constitutional policy promoting the progress of
the useful arts by extending patent protection to non-incorporating
devices, thereby restricting competition in the sale of unpatented
goods.1"' The court rejected that contention, holding that RiteHite was not trying to prohibit the production or sale of goods not
covered by the '847. '02 To the contrary, the court found that lost
profit damages for non-covered goods merely provide additional
incentive to risk taking and invention by fully compensating the
10 3
patentee for any losses that occur as a result of infringement.
In addition, the court explicitly held that the previous standard
for establishing causation-in-fact, the four-part Panduit test, 10 4 is
sufficient, but not necessary, to demonstrate but for causation. 0 5
The court conceded that in the past the Panduit test had been
applied only to cases involving lost profits on devices covered by the
patent whose infringement was at issue in the suit."° Nevertheless, the court held that all the Panduit factors had been met,
including the second one requiring the absence of all "acceptable
non-infringing substitutes."10 7 The court held that the ADL-100
did not count as such a substitute because it was sold, not by a
third party competitor, but by Rite-Hite itself."8
However, the court vacated the lower court's award of collateral
lost profit damages on the dock levelers. 1"9 After examining
precedent, the court determined that the entire market value rule

10

Id. at 1547.

101Id.
102

id.

103Id.
104

See supra Part II(A) for discussion of Panduittest.

10 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir.) ("Panduitis not the sine

qua non for proving 'but for' causation. If there are other ways to show that the infringement in fact caused the patentee's lost profits, there is no reason why another test should
not be acceptable .... [O]ther fact situations may require different means of evaluation.
."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
10 Id.
17 Id.
" Id. (comparing State Indus. v. Mor-Flo, Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
10

9 Id. at 1543.
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did not allow for lost profits in this case."' The court held that,
although the dock levelers could be used with the restraints, they
could also be used separately."' Moreover, the court held that
the restraints and levelers did not work together as a unit to create
a desired result." 2 Rather, the court found that the levelers were
sold with the restraints "only as a matter of convenience or
business advantage.""' Therefore, the court reasoned, the appropriate relationship did not exist between the dock levelers and
either of Rite-Hite's restraints to justify a damage award on the
levelers." 4
The court distinguished its decision to award damages on the
ADL-100 from its dock leveler decision. Here, the court relied on
the general patent law policy redressing competitive injury, and on
the Constitution's promotion of the useful arts." 5 The court ruled
that the Constitution requires a damage award only where lost
profits arise out of competition."' The court emphasized that the7
ADL-100 directly competed with Kelley's infringing Truk Stop."
The levelers, on the other hand, neither competed with the Truk
Stop nor properly functioned with Rite-Hite's restraints." 8
Therefore, the circuit court vacated the district court's award of lost
profit damages on the dock levelers, finding it erroneous as a
matter of law." 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF RITE-HITE V. KELLEY

As noted, until Rite-Hite the Federal Circuit had never confronted
the issue of whether the scope of patent damages includes profits
from the sale of a product other than the one covered by the patent
at suit. Nevertheless, the court easily expanded the scope of

10

Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549-51.
. Id at 1551.
Id.
'is Id.
14Id.
11 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
116d.
17 Id.
1181&

"' Id.
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compensable damages to include such lost profits.12 ° The court,
seemingly unconcerned by the precedential magnitude of its
decision, simply applied the principle of "but for" causation already
established in earlier case law to the new fact pattern, thereby
properly affirming the damage award on the ADL-100.
The ruling, then, in some respects is not revolutionary.'21
However counter-intuitive it may seem to award damages for injury
to a device not covered by the patent at suit, such an award
nonetheless follows the statutory and precedential mandate to fully
compensate the patentee. Here, Rite-Hite showed, transaction-bytransaction, customer-by-customer, that Kelley "snatched" RiteHite's sales contacts.'2 2 Although still circumstantial,' 23 such
transaction-based proof is tantamount to the customers who bought
Kelley's Truk Stop testifying that they would have bought RiteHite's restraints but for Kelley's underbidding. 24 Such a situation falls squarely within the but for principle of causation
established by earlier cases. 125
Additionally, awarding lost profits on items not covered by the
patent at suit will serve as an incentive to innovation, thus
furthering the constitutional policy promoting the useful arts.
First, patentees will be encouraged to invent if they know that
their inventions cannot be used against them to damage their
market share of similar goods.126 Second, potential infringers are
given a greater incentive to design around patented inventions,

'0The Court treated the subject in roughly four pages. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544-48.
See Janicke, supranote 51, at 695 (discussing recent evolution of patent damages law).
'2 Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (E.D. Wis. 1991), affd in part, vacated in part, 56

F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
" See Gary M. Ropski et al., Enforcement Defense, C567 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
SECURING AND ENFORCING PATENT RIGHTS 439, 453-54 (Nov. 15, 1990) (commenting on

circumstantial nature of proof of lost profits).
m See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. at 1527 n.7 (indicating impracticality
of direct evidence of causation in patent damage suits). See also, Laura B. Pincus, The
Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 95, 106
(1991) (citing Central Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 490 (Fed. Cir. 1983): "[I]n cases where the infringer steals customers, the Federal
Circuit has looked to the sales of the infringer.").
'For a discussion of such precedent, see supra Part II.
rm See Malloy & Renke, supranote 38, at 294-95 (discussing relationship of antitrust and
patent damages issues).
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thus creating
more, and perhaps better, ways to accomplish a
12 7
task.

Moreover, in line with State Industries' and BIC Leisure's
demand that courts closely map marketplace realities,"2 the
court here fashioned a more economically coherent definition of the
"value of a patent." The court recognized that the market power of
a patent refers not only to the power to generate profit from the
sale of patented devices, but also to the power to exclude others
from making such sales."'
Yet, notwithstanding the simple realism of the court's ruling, the
opinion is not completely satisfying. Rite-Hite addresses two main
issues. The first issue is the more narrow and obvious one-whether a patentee may sue for damages on a product not covered by the
patent at suit. The second, broader issue asks whether courts
should look to the "but for" model to determine the scope of
compensable harm. The court's award of lost profit damages on the
ADL-100 provides an affirmative answer to the first question, and
implies the same for the second. However, the court's failure to
award damages on the dock levelers calls into question its commitment to the but for model for determining the proper scope of
compensable patent damages.
This analysis, then, will briefly explore some of the tensions that
lie within the opinion, focusing on the potential reaction to these
tensions from both private parties and the courts. Such an
exploration will, it is hoped, shed some light on the difficult nature
of awarding lost profit damages, and on why the lower courts might
be reluctant to apply a straightforward but for model of damage
assessment. The analysis will first observe some practical implications of the court's award of damages on the ADL-100. It will then
address what guidance Rite-Hite might provide the lower courts in
determining the proper scope of compensable lost profit damages.

"' See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
352 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[T'he incentive to 'design around' patents is a positive result of the
patent system.").
'

See supra Part II(A) for a discussion of State Industries and BIC Leisure.

12 See Richard T. Rapp & Philip A. Beutel, Patent Damages: Rules on the Road to

Economic Rationality, in PATENT LITIGATION 1991, at 344 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1991) (proposing broad
reading of patent's value).
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A. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RITE-HITE

First, Rite-Hite raises interesting strategic considerations for a
potential plaintiff. Before Rite-Hite, a patentee's goal was to
narrow down, as much as possible, the market in which its product
competed. 3 0 The lesser the competition, the greater the likelihood that the infringer's sales would have gone to the plaintiff and
not to some third party's cheaper, non-infringing substitute. RiteHite, however, creates an incentive for a patentee to prove a market
broad enough to include not only the infringed product, but also a
product not covered by the patent at suit. Such a strategy puts the
patentee at risk of proving that a third party's product might also
compete with the patentee's product. Therefore, the patentee who
wishes to prove Rite-Hite-type damages must strike a balance
between proving too little and proving too much.
Rite-Hite itself provides some guidance on how to strike this
balance. Although Rite-Hite was interested in damages for its lost
sales on the patented MDL-55, it was mainly concerned with profits
from the better selling ADL-100. This suggests that a potential
plaintiff should look to the relative magnitude of its products'
profits to determine which it would most like to obtain from the
defendant.1 3 1
Next, there is the more general observation that Rite-Hite will
engender more patent infringement suits. Courts will now be
awarding larger lost profit damages as they account for lost sales
of items not covered by the patent at suit. This is in keeping with
the recent trend of larger patent infringement damage awards and
settlements. 3 2 The obvious effect of larger awards is more
suits."" The potential payoff of successful litigation will entice
companies to explore litigation as a way to enhance their prof134
its.

L" Pincus, supra note 124, at 119.

Rite-Hite's facts are probably atypical, however, in that the patented MDL-55 was
actually cheaper and less marketable than the automated Truk Stop and ADL-100.
13 Janicke, supra note 51, at 693-94 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541, modified, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (D. Mass. 1991) ($873
million)).
133Janicke, supra note 51, at 694.
13
4 Id.
13'
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The court's ruling also encourages more suits by allowing for
more legitimate opportunities to sue. First, the ruling would allow
a patentee who has a commercially weak or non-commercialized
patent to seek lost profits for an act of infringement that damages
profits from another device not itself covered by the patent at
suit.13
Indeed, Rite-Hite's MDL-55 was itself of questionable
commercial viability:"
the evidence indicated the MDL-55's
failure to capture a significant share of the vehicle restraint
market. 3 7 Thus, where prior to Rite-Hite, demand for the
patented good seemed a prerequisite for a successful suit, 3 ' now
patentees can sue for39lost profits even where no demand for the
patented item exists.
Second, the opinion would allow patentees to pursue lost profits
on products available in the public domain. 40 The court suggests
a higher evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs who seek such damages,' 4 ' however, by recalling the Panduit test's second factor, the
absence of an acceptable non-infringing substitute. The patentee
would need to prove that, absent the infringement, no third
party 4 1 would have made a non-infringing device capable of

3
" Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547-48 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
184 (1995). See, e.g., Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillete Co., 788 F. Supp. 439,22 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1678 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (allowing holder of non-commercialized patent to seek lost profit
damages for product not covered by patent at suit).
6 If the MDL-55 were in the same market as the ADL-100 and the Truk Stop, its
considerably lower price (Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1543) should have assured it greater
commercial success. Here, it would seem that customers were primarily attracted to the
Truk Stop's automation, not its incorporation of the '847 technology. See Janicke, supra note
51, at7 701-702 (discussing defining effect of customers' "mindset" on market).
"1 Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (E.D. Wis. 1991), afrd in part, vacated in part,56
F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
1 See supra Part II(A) for discussion of Panduit test.
139See Janicke, supra note 51, at 700 (discussing likelihood of suit without element of

demand).
"4Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
184 (1995). Because the ADL-100 was not in the public domain, this part of the opinion is
dicta.
141The court calls such a scenario a "different story." Id.
" The court specifically mentions "third party." Id. Presumably then, the court will not
allow the infringer to lessen its damages by arguing that, absent the infringement, the
infringer itself would have made the publicly available substitute.
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beating out the patentee's publicly available device for the sale."4
Higher damage awards and a greater amount of suits will result
in greater stress on the judicial system. First, additional suits will

further crowd the federal docket. 1" Second, the ruling will make
the cases themselves even more complex."
In addition to the
substantial evidence already proffered regarding the effect of
infringement on products covered by the patent at suit,146 the
ruling invites proof of lost profits from similar items not covered by

such a patent. Moreover, because the court affirmed the principle
of a fact-driven, case-by-case method for determining lost profits,
the quality of argumentation and proof will also become more
nuanced and variable. 147 Similarly, with higher damages on the

line, attorneys will have a greater incentive to develop a case's
complexity.' 4s
Increased and more extensive litigation will adversely affect
potential defendants and benefit potential plaintiffs. The loss of
competitiveness attendant to a defendant's loss in ability to sell the
patented technology, coupled with both a decrease in the defendant's assets and an increase in the assets of the plaintiff-competi-

14

Id& Here, a patentee's approach would depend on the facts. In a multi-competitor

market, the patentee would rely on a BIC Leisure market share approach to prove
entitlement to a share of the infringer's sales. In a two-competitor market, a plaintiff would
rely on the sheer absence of any similar third party device to indicate the improbability that
such a device would have existed absent the infringement.
1
" Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and PatentLaw, 3 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 1,
4 & n.12 (1993).
145
[Clomplex issues often arise [in patent infringement suite]. The
complexity ... will influence the number of attorneys working on the
case and the amount of time each attorney spends on the case. Complex
issues require more, and more thorough, discovery, and create more
opportunities for time-consuming disputes to arise between the parties.
Norman H. Zivin & Wendy E. Miller, An Overview of a PatentLaw Suit and the Decisionto
File, in PATENT LITIGATION 1991, at 90 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 320, 1991). Patent damages are already so complex as
to require bifurcated liability and damages proceedings (Pincus, supra note 124, at 95) and
can take up to several years to complete. In Rite-Hite itself, nearly nine years elapsed
between the finding of liability and the close of damage proceedings. 56 F.3d at 1543.
148 See W. Davis Westergard, Harmonization Enforcement: The Reality Behind the
Panacea,26 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 593, 593 (1993) (observing that patent "litigators will take
depositions 'till the cows come home' ").
1,7 See Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 288-90 (discussing complexity of market
analysis).
148 Casey, supra note 144, at 1.
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tor, could spell ruin to a defendant's enterprise.14 At the least,
potential patent infringement defendants may face higher liability
insurance premiums to cover both the increased cost of litigating

such 15suits
as well as the costs of settlements or adverse rul°
ings.
The cost of pursuing larger damages, however, may also serve to
shrink the pool of potential plaintiffs. Already expensive, 1 ' the
costs of performing the further market analysis required to prove
lost profits on devices not covered by the patent at suit may become
prohibitive. 152 Some smaller plaintiffs may therefore be "priced
out" of such litigation, leaving it to the larger plaintiffs to exploit
the potential for larger revenue.
The specter of longer, more complex and more frequent litigation
may lead courts to simplify rather than complicate their damages
proceedings." 5 Courts, forced to deal with an increasingly more
complex and voluminous caseload, will need some precedent or
procedure to simplify their decision making and lighten their
burden. Such simplification may take many forms. Courts may
simply set time limits on damages proceedings. 54 Or, courts may
look to lessen the incentive of potential plaintiffs to litigate by
requiring a tighter nexus between infringement and damages. For
example, courts might look to alter the burdens borne by the
parties regarding proof of damages.'5 5
1,9 See Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 354,

357 1(1987) (regarding effect of damage award on infringer).
" See David A. Gauntlett, Changing Winds: Recent Decisions Favor Policyholders in
Intellectual Property Coverage Claims, 5 NO. 3 Coverage 20 (May/June 1995) (regarding
trend of increased liability coverage for patent infringement).
161 Casey, supra note 144, at 4 & n.13 (pricing cost of patent litigation at between one-half
and 200 million dollars).
162 Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 289 (pertinently asking: "How much justice can
afford?").
a client
163
See HARMON, supra note 41, at 410 (regarding discretion of district court to determine
damages).
Malloy & Renke, supra note 38, at 289.
" See Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and FutureLost ProfitsDamages,
26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747 (1994) (advocating "reasonable certainty" standard for future lost
profits); see also Janicke, supra note 51, at 698-99 & nn.40-41 (quoting Tektronix, Inc. v.
U.S., 552 F.2d 343, 349, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048,
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 704 (1978): "Iflost profits are ever to be awarded... it should be only
after the strictest proof that the patentee would actually have earned and retained those
sums in its sales .... ").
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Currently, after the plaintiff has made a showing of reasonable
probability, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the
causal link between infringement and lost profits." Under that
rule, the plaintiff need only show that some of his losses were
caused by the defendant in order to make a showing of reasonable
probability. 5 7 Although a new rule requiring more of a showing
by the plaintiff may lead to even more discovery and argument as
the plaintiff struggles to meet an increased burden, it may also lead
to fewer exorbitant damage awards and therefore fewer suits.
More importantly, however, courts, contrary to the urging of the
Federal Circuit in State Industries',BIC Leisure, and Rite-Hite, may
look once again to formulas and bright line rules to determine the
scope of damages, rather than delve into the complexities of the
relevant marketplace. That would be an ironic result, especially
since this case seems so simply to state the law and its application.
But the Rite-Hite decision is not without irony. Although the court
purports to call for simplicity with its straightforward application
of the "but for" test, the opinion thereby calls for a more complex,
case-by-case analysis of the parties' involvement in the market.'"
Unfortunately, Rite-Hite fails to provide adequate guidance for
dealing with such complexity.
B. RITE-HITE AS A GUIDE FOR LOWER COURTS

As an initial matter, the facts of Rite-Hite do not provide a
helpful model for determining lost profit damages. Rite-Hite, after
all, presents the easy case: the two competitor market. The
inference of causation between infringement and lost sales rises to
the level of presumption in such a market.'5 9 Moreover, two
competitor cases are rare.'" Even rarer still, one must suppose,
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id.; see also Janicke, supra note 51, at 705 n.82 (regarding burdens of respective
parties on damages issue).
" See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995) (discussing need for fact-driven determination of compensable damages).
" See Pappas et al., supra note 87, at 71 (quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton
Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987): "[I]t is more reasonable to assume
that the patentee would have made the infringer's sales in this [two-competitor] situation
as opposed to a highly competitive market.*).
Jarosz & Page, supra note 56, at 321.
IGO
15

157
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is the two competitor case with such straightforward, transactionby-transaction proof. The case, therefore, did not require the kind
of rigorous examination of the market required in the more
common multi-competitor situation.
Next, the Rite-Hite court itself evidenced attachment to the
formulaic approach. Despite the ease of the case, and despite
disclaimers about the necessity of formula, the court twice relied on
the Panduitanalysis. Importantly, the court employed the test in
its only attempt to show that the Truk Stop actually caused RiteHite's decrease in restraint sales.16 1 The court again relied on the
test when discussing how a patentee must prove lost profits on an
item available in the public domain.'6 2
Most tellingly, the court vacated the award for lost profits on the
dock levelers."
There, the court refused to let causation and
foreseeability alone establish what damages were compensable.
Instead, the court relied on an unrealistic conception of "competition" in order to avoid such damages."6 In so doing, the court
created a bright line rule that avoids placing patentees in the
position they would have been in but for the infringement.
Unfortunately, the court's treatment of this issue is not a model of
judicial clarity. The ruling does, however, issue some clear
implications.
The court ruled that only those damages that arise out of direct
competition with an infringing device are compensable. 1" In so
ruling, the court appears to have constitutionalized the competition
requirement.'"
The rule is that only those losses that result
from competition with the infringing device merit compensation. 16 The court gleans the competition requirement from its
interpretation of "patent law."16 Patent law, according to the
court, limits compensation to competitive injury."a The court,

1 61

Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1548.
' RId.
16 3
d. at 1551.
16
16

'

17

Id. at 1549.
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
Id. at 1551.

68

1 Id.
1 ld
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then, purports merely to be enforcing the policy judgment inherent
in patent law that only competitive injury need be compensated to
deter infringement and protect patentees. The problem with this
rule is that it does not define "competition" broadly enough.
Conceivably, the court's ruling was an attempt to equate
competition with foreseeability. The court may have reasoned that
only those injuries that arise out of competition are foreseeable,
and that therefore a competition limitation would be sufficient to
deter infringement and protect the defendant. If the court were
using "competition" merely to identify all the ways that infringement foreseeably causes harm to the patentee's business, then the
rule would make sense as a reasonable limitation on but for
causation. The court's conception of competition, however, is
narrower, and thus more restrictive of damages, than a foreseeability requirement.
In a convoluted passage, the court implied that in order to be
compensable, a patentee's products must do one of two things.1 70
The products may, like the MDL-55 and ADL-100 in this case,
directly compete with an infringing device.17 ' If, however, the
items are collateral to the patented product, like the dock levelers
here, they will need to qualify as competitive under the entire
market value rule.'7 2 To so qualify, collateral items will need to
"function with" another of the patentee's devices that directly
competes with the infringing device.' 73
In order to function with a directly competitive device, the
collateral device must work with the primary device as a "function174
ing unit .... so as to produce a desired end product or result."
The court suggests that if the collateral device has any independent, self-sufficient function, it cannot qualify under the entire
market value rule. 1 75 According to the court, devices that do not
function with the patented device but nonetheless normally sell
along with it are only "matter[s] of convenience or business

170Id.
11

at

1549-51.

"172 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
d. at 1549.
173 Id. at 1550.
174 1&

175Id,

at 1551.
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advantage." 7 ' As such, profits lost on these devices will not
qualify as grounds for compensation.
The court did not explain why the dock levelers and the restraints did not operate to assure the safe passage of workers
between dock and truck. Instead, the court found that because the
two items could be used separately, the dock levelers were not part
177
of a functioning unit that competed with the infringing product.
Thus, the
court did not award profits lost on the sale of the
17
levelers.

The court's ruling regarding function is unfortunate in several
respects. First, it directly contradicts the district court's finding
that the restraints reached their full utility only in conjunction
with dock levelers. 79 The levelers and restraints did work
together to produce the desired end result of safe passage between
truck and dock. Therefore, even under its narrow "function with"
rubric, the court should have awarded damages on the dock
levelers.
Furthermore, the function with requirement is inconsistent with
previous rulings on the entire market value rule. For example, in
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., the court found lost plastic wrap
sales to be compensable upon a finding of infringement of an
industrial wrapping machine." s This suggests that a patentee's
collateral item need not narrowly function with the patented item
in order to qualify as compensable. Moreover, in TWM Manufacturing v. Dura Corp., the court rejected the argument that profits
lost on collateral items sold along with a patented item for the sake
of convenience were uncompensable.' 8 '
More importantly, the function with limitation fails to realistically assess marketplace behavior. Certainly, the power of a patented
item to generate sales of related items, or prevent sales of competi-

17 8

Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550.

'77Id. at 1551.
178 id.

" Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1530 (E.D. Wis. 1991), affd in part,
vacated in part, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
180 926 F.2d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
'a' 789 F.2d 895, 901, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986) ("We reject [the] argument that the inclusion of unpatented items in the ... lost
profits determination is dependent... on whether they are supplied for 'convenience.' ").
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tors' items, is part of its competitive power. Indeed, the court's
recognition of this power of the patent was critical to its damage
award on the ADL-100. 8 2 As a result of its ruling on the ADL100, the court should have recognized that patented items can
compete even with collateral items. The fact that collateral sales
convenience the customer and help create a business advantage for
the seller supports this broader notion of competition. Such sales
prove that patents help patentees compete. The court, therefore,
undervalued the market power of a patent. As a result, the court
failed to adequately protect the patentee, and thus created a
disincentive to publication.
The court's failure to fully account for marketplace realities is
particularly egregious given the facts of the case and overall import
of the opinion. The evidence plainly showed that but for Kelley's
infringement, Rite-Hite would have sold additional dock levelers. 183 Moreover, Kelley intended to protect its dock leveler
market via its marketing of the Truk Stop and thus anticipated the
injury to Rite-Hite's dock leveler sales."8 ' Clearly, then, Kelley
itself foresaw a competitive relationship between the dock levelers
and the restraints.
Regarding the damages on the ADL-100, the court noted that "if
the patent infringement had nothing to do with the lost sales, 'but
for' causation would not have been proven.""s There, the court
indicated its commitment to let what would have happened in the
marketplace guide its determination of damages. Regarding the
dock levelers, however, the court failed to follow through on this
commitment. Thus, the court's dock leveler ruling undermines its
commitment to a "but for" model of damage analysis.
V. CONCLUSION

Rite-Hite is an important decision. From now on, patentees will
be allowed to pursue damages on similar products not covered by
the patent at suit. This will result in larger damage awards and
" For a discussion of the court's reasoning regarding damages on the ADL-100 see supra
text accompanying notes 94-97, 128-129.
' Rite-Hite, 774 F. Supp. at 1530.
184
lId
1
85 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1996

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4

352

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

(Vol. 3:327

greater protection for the patentee. The opinion will therefore
engender more, and more complicated, patent infringement suits.
Moreover, the opinion seems to represent a radical commitment to
a but for model for assessing damages.
The dock leveler portion of the opinion, however, indicates
important policy issues left unarticulated by the court. In not
awarding damages on the dock levelers, the court called into
question its more important ruling on the ADL-100. Apparently,
the court feared too quickly opening the floodgates of damage
claims that could potentially overwhelm both the courts and
defendants.
Rite-Hite highlights the complexity involved in awarding patent
damages. Unfortunately, the court fails to provide lower courts
with clear guidance on how to deal with such complexity. The
court speaks of allowing the facts of each case to dictate the scope
of compensable harm, yet, fearful of what might result in later
litigation, hedges on, and thus undermines, its own principles of
causation and foreseeability. Indeed, the court indicates that where
issues of policy so mandate, it is proper to undermine those
principles by awarding lesser damages than those actually foreseen
and caused in fact by the infringement. Thus, the court leaves it
to the lower courts to fill in the potentially vast landscape of
compensable harm opened up by its decision.
ROBERT J. Cox
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